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1. Introduction 
 
Several studies have provided evidence that the positive reaction of the target 
firm’s stock price to a takeover announcement is a global phenomenon.1 Recent 
evidence also documents that large shareholders are very common worldwide, 
especially in countries with relatively less-developed stock markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Sheifler, 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens,, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). 
While acquirers usually own no or very few shares in target firms before the acquisition 
announcement (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2009), there are cases in which the 
acquirer not only owns a sizable stake in the target firm but is the firm’s controlling 
shareholder (Bae, Kang, and Kim, 2002; Bigelli and Mengoli, 2004; Holmen and Knopf, 
2004; Buysschaert, Deloof, and Jegers, 2004). Bates, Lemmon and Linck (2006) find that 
minority shareholders are still able to exercise significant bargaining power and obtain a 
decent return in U.S. freeze-out bids, even if there is no change of control at stake.2  
However, this cannot be ruled as a universal phenomenon given the different degree of 
countries’ stock market development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 
1997). Hence, in this paper, we examine the relationship between the target firm’s 
minority shareholders’ returns and stock market development in deals in which 
controlling shareholders increase their ownership stakes.  
To examine the gains earned by minority shareholders across the world, we 
focus on merger and acquisition (M&A) deals in which controlling shareholders acquire 
                                                 
1
 For the U.S. market, see for example Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Weston, Mitchell, and 
Mulherin, 2004; and Bruner, 2004. Andrade et al. (2001) report an average target reaction of 13% for 
stock acquisitions and 20.1% for cash acquisitions in the event window (-1, +1) surrounding the 
acquisition announcement. European evidence is provided by Martynova and Renneboog (2006), who 
find an average market reaction of 12.28% for target firms in the event window (-1, +1).  
2
 Bates, Lemon, and Linck (2006) report an average announcement period excess return of 14.9% for U.S. 
freeze-out bids. 
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all or some of the remaining minority shareholdings in listed companies they already 
control. Throughout the paper, we define these deals as increase-in-ownership 
transactions. In contrast to acquisition proposals made by unrelated parties, target 
minority investors in increase-in-ownership M&As are less likely to be endangered by 
entrenched managers willing to fight off offers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), but they are 
clearly at a disadvantage against a bidder who already controls the company (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  
Controlling shareholders often claim that their increase-in-ownership 
transactions are necessary to restructure their individual portfolios or business groups 
and that such deals are value-increasing projects. Even if the bidder already controls the 
target firm, it often needs greater or even full control to exploit synergies and reduce 
costs.3 For example, in increase-in-ownership deals aimed at delisting target firms, the 
delisting of the target permits the controlling firm to save on the cost of compliance 
with the securities laws (Carney, 2006).4 Moreover, many controlling shareholders 
believe that dealing with minority shareholders may prevent their companies from 
quickly responding to competitive pressures.5 Large shareholders sometimes increase 
                                                 
3
 For example, Sandvik AB (Sweden) claimed that owning (at least) a 75% stake in Sandvik Asia (India) 
was “necessary in order to ensure control of proprietary technology, provide flexibility of operations and 
enable it to comply with group philosophy” (AFX News, November 25
th
, 1997). The acquisition of the 
remaining 50% of Internet Auction Co. Ltd. (Korea) by Ebay, Inc. (U.S.A.) was explained as follows: “it 
wants to buy the rest of the Korean company to more strongly align ownership and management and to 
boost operational flexibility in the Korean marketplace” (Daily Deal, November 25
th
, 2003). Scott 
Greenberg, National Patent's chief financial officer, commented on the acquisition of General Physics that 
“by owning 100 percent, it will allow us to throw more resources behind the company" (The Washington 
Post, September 26
th
, 1996). 
4
 The effects of higher costs of being public have been analyzed in great detail in the U.S. following the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 (see, for example, Litvak, 2007; Leuz, 2007; Zhang, 2007; 
Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, 2008; Marosi and Massoud, 2008). See also the recent literature on going-
private transactions (Bharath and Dittmar, 2009). 
5
 Just to give a few examples in which competitive pressure was cited among the reasons for completing 
the deal (acquirer in parenthesis): Eaux des mineral de Vittel (Nestle’) in 1991; Comau (Fiat) in 1999; 
 3 
their ownership stake to prevent block creation by other shareholders, who may be 
hostile (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001; Croci, 2007). Finally, there could be cases in 
which minority shareholders, lacking a liquid market in which to trade their shares,6 
demand and put pressure on the large shareholders to buy them out.7  
Using an exhaustive sample of 1,174 increase-in-ownership acquisitions across 
46 countries over the period 1989–2005, we provide evidence that increase-in-
ownership transactions do create considerable value for target shareholders. Consistent 
with Bates et al. (2006), minority shareholders in target firms earn an average 
announcement excess return of 11.95% in the five-day period around the acquisition 
announcement (-2, +2). However, when we partition the sample at the country level, we 
find a significant variation in the abnormal returns around the acquisition 
announcement. Thus, these deals provide an ideal testing ground for exploring the 
reasons why minority shareholders obtain a relatively larger premium.  
Previous literature suggests that a different degree of investor protection may be 
the reason for these differences in bidders’ behavior when they already control the 
target firm. The legal approach to corporate governance proposed by La Porta et al. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Electrabel (Suez) in 2005; Nitto Chemical Industry Co. Ltd. (Mitsubishi Rayon Co. Ltd.) in 1997; Acer 
Computer Intl. (Acer Inc.) in 1999; Magellan Petro Australia Ltd. (Magellan Petroleum Ltd.) in 2005. In the 
Nitto case, for example, it was reported that the two firms “hope that by putting together their 
technological and human resources, they will be able to increase their overall competitiveness” (Jiji Press 
Ticker Service, 22 December 1997).  
6
 Lack of liquidity was the main reason leading to the acquisition of the remaining outstanding shares in 
Ogden Projects by Ogden Corp. in 1994. R. Richard Ablon, President  & Chief Executive Officer of Ogden, 
said, "It has become increasingly apparent that the limited public float in shares of OPI common stock 
make this security less and less attractive to the investing public. It has been and continues to be difficult 
to develop a broad investor base for OPI common stock, particularly since Ogden has no intention of 
reducing its current ownership interest. We believe that the proposed transaction is an effective way to 
merge the two companies (Business Wire, 6 June 1994). 
7
 Minority shareholders’ pressure was the driving factor that lead to the buyouts of minorities in Cie 
d'Investissement de Paris (France) by BNP, a French bank, in May 1995, and in Rhin et Moselle Assurance, 
a French company, by a subsidiary of Allianz SE (Germany) in November 1996.  
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(1997, 1998) emphasizes the role played by the legal system, including both laws and 
their enforcement, in protecting outside investors (La Porta et al., 2000). La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998, 2000) also report that protection of outside investors is positively 
correlated with stock market development and find that common-law countries have 
both the strongest protection for outside investors and the most developed markets. 
Though investor protection and stock market development are closely related, the latter 
captures issues beyond investor protection. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that 
investor protection alone cannot explain the reversals in a country’s financial 
development and the fact that stock market development indicators are time-varying. In 
their view, the strength of political forces in favor of financial development plays a key 
role in developing strong financial markets, and the country’s financial development is 
the outcome of ideology and the economic interests of voters and pressure groups 
(Aganin and Volpin, 2005). Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the stock 
market can be either fostered or hampered by government action, depending upon the 
balance of powers between pressure groups.  
Another important side of stock market development not fully captured by 
investor protection is market openness. Rajan and Zingales (2003) also discuss the role 
of a country’s openness to trade and capital flows in promoting financial development. 
However, such promotion can be done without conceding too much power to minority 
investors. In fact, Aganin and Volpin (2005) provide the example of Italy, where 
openness is not associated with investor protection—while Italy has been a relatively 
open market, its investor protection is poor (La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov, La Porta, 
Lopes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). Along these lines, Pagano and Volpin (2001) and 
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Biais and Perotti (2002) argue that state intervention in the economy should be 
negatively correlated with financial development because the state acts as a substitute 
for financial markets. Finally, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) argue that trust 
affects participation in the stock market, and thus its development.  
Generally, in countries with well-developed stock markets, a significant fraction 
of the country’s population owns stock (Pagano and Volpin, 2006). Larger participation 
of investors in firms’ equity serves as a guarantee of exposure to the media in cases of 
outrageous expropriations by controlling shareholders. In fact, as documented by Miller 
(2006), the press tends to cover firms that will be of interest to many readers. This is 
certainly not the case in countries with less-developed markets, where violations often 
go unnoticed, barring active lobbying by foreign funds in the international press (Dyck, 
Volchkova, and Zingales, 2008). Given these considerations, we argue that stock market 
development, which summarizes and incorporates the impacts of the determinants 
mentioned above, is an important driving force of the returns realized by target 
shareholders around increase-in-ownership acquisitions. This effect captures sides 
beyond investor protection.  
In this paper, we employ two measures of stock market development used in the 
financial and economic development literature (Levine and Zervos, 1998) to test its 
impact on the abnormal return earned by target shareholders around increase-in-
ownership acquisition announcements: (1) turnover over GDP, and (2) turnover over 
market capitalization. These two measures capture trading activity, or to put it 
differently, actual participation in the stock market. For the purpose of this study, they 
are both superior to the ratio between stock market capitalization and the country’s 
 6 
GDP for two main reasons. First, market capitalization includes the value of the large 
shareholder’s blocks that in general trade infrequently, particularly when they are 
owned by families, individuals or states (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Klasa, 2007; 
Allen, Qian, and Qian, 2005).8 These blocks represent a large proportion of a country’s 
market capitalization, especially outside of the U.S. (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Claessens et al., 2000). Second, as argued by Rajan and Zingales (2003), a 
disadvantage of stock market capitalization is that it can be affected by large increases 
in the value of a few companies even if few people are trading and few firms are raising 
equity in this market.  
We find that target minority shareholders gain significantly more in developed 
markets than in less financially developed countries. The return differential ranges from 
4.75% to 10.38% and is statistically significant for the two proxies of stock market 
development. The multivariate analysis confirms this result and provides further 
evidence of the strongly significant positive relationship between target shareholders’ 
returns and the country’s stock market development. The results are robust after 
controlling for several deal- and firm-specific characteristics as well as different event 
windows.9  
 This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides 
evidence of the strong positive relationship between stock market development and 
                                                 
8
 Holderness and Sheehan (1988) compare the likelihood of a control change between firms that are 
majority-owned by families and those majority-owned by corporations. They find that firms in which the 
majority shareholder was an individual investor (or family) were less likely to be acquired. Klasa (2007) 
finds only 84 observations for the sale of the family’s controlling stake in the U.S. over a long period 
(1984–1998). 
9
 More specifically, we also employ more extended windows—i.e., 11 (-5, +5) and 21 (-10, +10) days, 
respectively, surrounding the acquisition announcement day to allow information about the transaction 
to be leaked in advance or be incorporated slowly into the stock prices. This issue is particularly relevant 
in countries with inefficient equity markets. 
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target-firm minority shareholders’ wealth effects. This indicates that an active and more 
developed stock market favors minority shareholders, as reflected in the significant 
gains earned around the acquisition announcement even in transactions with no change 
of control. Second, it carries out the first worldwide analysis of increase-in-ownership 
M&A deals, thus illustrating the cross-country determinants of target returns. Finally, 
the evidence that minority shareholders benefit from developed stock markets has 
useful implications for policymakers and shows the importance of a developed stock 
market in disciplining the behavior of large shareholders.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
measures of stock market development, the data, and sample characteristics. Section 3 
reports the results of the empirical analysis, and Section 4 discusses the forms of the 
deals and the underlying motivations. Section 5 discusses and presents robustness tests. 
Finally, Section 6 provides the conclusions. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Measures of Stock Market Development 
To measure stock market development and examine its relationship with target 
minority shareholders’ returns, we employ two proxies of market liquidity. Following 
Levine and Zervos (1998), we use: (1) turnover over GDP, which is the value of the 
trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges over GDP; and (2) turnover over 
domestic market capitalization, which is the value of the trades of domestic equities on 
domestic exchanges relative to the size of the market.  
 8 
While market capitalization has often been used as a measure of stock market 
development, this variable has several shortcomings. In particular, by definition, market 
capitalization includes the value of the controlling shareholder’s blocks, which trade 
infrequently (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Klasa, 2007; Allen, Litov, and Mei, 2006) 
and can represent a large proportion of a country’s market capitalization given that, 
outside the U.S., large shareholders are common (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Claessens et al., 2000). Rajan and Zingales (2003) highlight another drawback of 
stock market capitalization. This variable merely measures the amount of equity listed in 
the stock market. Hence, large increases in value of few companies can have a 
substantial impact on this measure even if few individuals are trading and few firms are 
raising equity in this market. In addition, as Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) argue, a large stock market is not necessarily liquid, and if it is not, it can 
fail to capture important aspects of stock market development. 
Hence, turnover-based measures serve as better proxies than stock market 
capitalization over GDP. In fact, given that controlling blocks trade infrequently, 
turnover is affected relatively less by the holdings of controlling shareholders.10 
However, in order to control for the influence of the price effect (Levine and Zervos, 
1998)11 and the relative size of financial markets with respect to the country’s GDP, we 
                                                 
10
 The difference between the two measures can be explained by comparing two hypothetical countries. 
In each of these countries, one company is listed on the local stock exchange. In the first country, the local 
firm has a large shareholder who owns 80% of its shares, and in the second country the corporation’s 
ownership is diffused with no large shareholder. While the market capitalization of the two companies 
could be the same, barring a sale of the company in country two, the dollar value of the turnover would 
be much higher in the second country. In all likelihood, few shares will be traded in the first country. 
11
 If markets anticipate future events, it is likely that stock prices will increase, raising the value of stock 
transactions and therefore the turnover value. The price effect influences both turnover and stock market 
capitalization. 
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also include the ratio between market capitalization and the country’s GDP in the 
regression analysis.  
 
2.2. Data and Sample Characteristics 
The original sample comprises all acquisitions of public target firms reported in 
Thomson Financial Securities Data’s Thomson ONE Banker during the period January 
1989 to December 2005. Our sample period begins in 1989 because our main variables 
at the country level have sufficient coverage in the World Development Indicators 
database only after 1989.  
We consider the completed acquisitions of more than 5% of the target’s equity 
that took place in 59 countries (listed in Table 1)12 with deal values of at least $1 million 
in which the acquirer owns at least 30% of the target firm’s capital after the transaction. 
Thirty percent of a company’s equity is generally a large-enough fraction to exercise 
control. In fact, in many takeover laws, more notably the U.K. Takeover Code, a 
shareholder who exceeds 30% of a company’s equity has to make a public offer for all 
the outstanding shares of the company.13 Thus, the 30% threshold is applied by many 
legislators to guarantee effective control to one party to the detriment of minority 
shareholders. For the above reasons, the 30% threshold is preferred to 20%, a usual 
cutoff point in the ownership structure literature to identify controlling shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002), and to 50%, the percentage of shares that 
                                                 
12
 A 60
th
 country, Taiwan, was dropped due to missing data in the World Development Indicators 
database. 
13
 The “Report on the implementation of the Directive on Takeover Bids,” a European Commission 
publication in February 2007, reports that the acquisition of a 30% stake (or 1/3) is a condition triggering a 
mandatory bid in 18 out of the 25 EU countries listed (see Appendix B in the Report). In one country, 
Slovenia, the threshold is even lower (25%). The largest European countries, like Germany, Italy, France, 
and the U.K., have a 30% (or 33.33%) threshold.  
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assure the shareholder the (simple) majority in any company’s vote.14 After this first 
step, the original sample is reduced to 18,213 deals that satisfy these requirements.  
The second step consists of the identification of increase-in-ownership 
transactions. The Thomson ONE Banker M&A database provides the names of ultimate 
owners for targets and acquirers. So, we initially rely on these two items to include in 
the sample all deals in which Thomson ONE Banker reports that both the target and the 
acquirer are controlled by the same firm/individual investor. As a result, 2,471 deals 
satisfy this requirement.  
However, since Thomson ONE Banker often reports the post-acquisition parent 
company of the target firm and not the pre-acquisition parent company, we manually 
searched information about these deals in articles available in Lexis/Nexis to confirm 
that the bidder (or a firm belonging to the acquirer’s group) is actually the ultimate 
owner of the target before the deal takes place. We also verified that these deals are 
new transactions and not just follow-ups of previous deals.15 We removed 937 false 
increase-in-ownership transactions with this manual search, without which we would 
have overestimated the number of increase-in-ownership acquisitions. Finally, we also 
excluded deals in which the stake held by the acquirers before the announcement was 
greater than 90% (75 cases), in order to eliminate squeeze-out bids. In squeeze-out bids, 
the minimum price is often determined by law, especially in European countries, and 
the free-float is small. A small free-float increases the price effects of trades (Chan, 
                                                 
14
 Our results are robust to cut-offs other than 30%. For example, we obtain similar results when we use 
either 50% or 75% cut-off points. 
15
 For example, if firm X acquires 70% of the target equity in March and then launches a tender offer in 
April for the remaining 30%, we do not include the tender offer in our sample. Deals of this type are 
required by law in many countries (mandatory bid rule). These deals are also not likely to generate any 
reaction at the time of the announcement because they are fully anticipated. 
 11 
Chan, and Fong, 2004) and makes float manipulation easier (Allen, Litov, and Mei, 2006; 
Greenwood, 2009). After these criteria, our sample is composed of 1,459 firms. 
 Finally, we verified whether target firms in the remaining 1,459 transactions 
have stock price data available on Datastream, which led to the loss of 285 firms. The 
final sample, which is used in the empirical analysis, includes 1,174 increase-in-
ownership deals in 46 countries.16 We summarize the steps that led to the final sample 
in Table 1. 
[Please include Table 1 about here] 
We present and describe all of the country-level, firm-level, and deal-specific 
variables used in the empirical analysis in Table 2. All variable definitions are listed in the 
Appendix. As expected, our two proxies for stock market development exhibit great 
variability, varying from values below 2% to values of over 200% for turnover over GDP 
and turnover over market capitalization, respectively. Other variables that relate to 
development are: the stock market capitalization over GDP, and private credit, 
computed as in Djankov, McLeish, and Shleifer (2007).17 In contrast to the other 
measures, which are mainly related to the equity markets, private credit is a proxy that 
captures the development of the financial system at large. We also include in the 
analysis variables that measure economic development (Levine and Zervos, 1998): the 
log of the per-capita GDP, which controls for differences in wealth between countries; 
                                                 
16
 There are 403 transactions from Europe, including 25 from the former Soviet bloc, 328 from Asia, 77 
from Australia and New Zealand, 25 from South Africa, and 341 from the Americas, of which 207 are from 
the United States. 
17
 This is the ratio of credit from deposit-taking financial institutions to the private sector (IFS lines 22d 
and 42d) to GDP (IFS line 99b), expressed as a percentage, for the year before the transactions. (IFS is the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics.) 
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and the annual GDP growth, to control for the country’s economic condition. Table 2 
reports descriptive statistics for all these variables. 
We also examine the country’s legal origin as a proxy for the quality of the legal 
system, as widely used in the law & finance literature (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). 
Another measure used to assess the degree of investor (shareholder) protection is the 
anti-director-rights index (ADRI), fist proposed by La Porta et al. (1997). In the empirical 
analysis, we use the revised ADRI as computed by Djankov et al. (2008) (DLLS Index) to 
measure shareholder protection.18 Table 2 also documents that almost half of the 
observations (47%) comes from countries of Common law tradition, which probably 
explains the high mean value of the investor protection index (DLLS equals 3.55). Finally, 
we use the percentage of households who own television sets to control for the impact 
of media pressure, following Dyck and Zingales (2004), who find that media pressure is a 
dominating factor in curbing private benefits and thus may affect the price offered to 
the targets’ shareholders.19 As reported in Table 2, the percentage of households 
owning television sets is relatively high in our sample.  
Regarding firm-level variables, we also include size, which is defined as the log of 
the firm’s market value of equity at the end of the year before the deal; ROA, which is 
the return on assets in the year before the deal; market-to-book (M/B), which is the 
ratio of the market value of equity in US$ divided by the common equity in US$ at the 
end of the year before the deal; stock-price performance during the year before the 
                                                 
18
 Note that these indices are based on information collected at a given point in time—i.e., the mid-1990s 
for La Porta et al. (1997), and recent years for Spamann (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008). Thus, there are 
cases in which the value of these indexes includes changes that took place after some of the deals. 
Unfortunately, there is no time series of any anti-director-rights index. 
19
 We select television over daily newspaper diffusion because the time series of the daily newspaper 
diffusion is incomplete and only values for the period 1997–2000 are available. 
 13 
deal; and leverage, which is the ratio of  the book value of financial debt as a percentage 
of the book value of total assets at the end of the year before the deal. We also include: 
cash holdings; which is the ratio of cash plus tradable securities over total assets at the 
end of the year before the deal; collateral, which is defined as the ratio of tangible 
assets to total assets at the end of the year before the deal; and the percentage of the 
target’s equity held by the bidder before the transaction.  
The median target market capitalization is U.S. $221 m. The acquiring firm owns, 
on average, more than 60% of the target firm’s equity before the deal (median equals 
62.9%) and increases its stake to 93% (median equals 100%) when the deal is 
completed. A considerable number of deals end with the bidder taking the target 
private (80.23%). Target firms do not exhibit good operating performance, with a 
median ROA of 3.94%, and their median stock-price performance in the year preceding 
the acquisition is 0%. Median market-to-book ratio of target firms is equal to 1.38. 
Further, targets hold, on average, a similar percentage of cash and debt.  
We also collect data about the most recent ownership structure of the bidding 
company before the acquisition announcement to identify the type of its controlling 
shareholder. We identify the ownership structure and the type of the controlling 
shareholder from a variety of sources, including the Claessens et al. (2000) and the 
Faccio and Lang (2002) databases,20 Worldscope, Lexis/Nexis, and companies’ Web sites. 
In this way, we obtain data about the type of controlling shareholders for 1,100 out of 
the 1,174 bidders.21 Bidders are classified into eight categories on the basis of the type 
                                                 
20
 Both the Claessens et al. (2000) and the Faccio and Lang (2002) databases are publicly available on the 
Journal of Financial Economics Web site.  
21
 We follow Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) in defining ultimate owners. 
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of their ultimate owner: family firm (463), state-owned firm (120), widely held firm 
(231), widely held financial institution (46), financial institution (125), those controlled 
by a widely held firm (52), those controlled by a widely held financial institution (42), 
and miscellaneous (the largest shareholders are the employees, foundations, etc.) (21). 
Finally, Table 2 also presents deal-specific variables. The first deal-specific 
variable is the pre-acquisition run-up, computed from 42 days to 3 days before the start 
of the event window, similar to Bates et al. (2006).22 Contrary to the literature (Schwert, 
1996; Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn, 2009), firms in our sample do not exhibit a 
substantial run-up in the period immediately before the acquisition. The average 
(median) run-up is 3.88% (2.6%). We also include a variable for the method of payment 
(cash). Cash deals usually exhibit larger reactions for both target and bidding firms than 
do stock-financed transactions (Huang and Walkling, 1987; Travlos, 1987; Faccio and 
Masulis, 2005). We define as a cash (stock) deal a transaction in which at least 80% of 
the deal value is paid in cash (stock). In our sample, there are 772 cash deals (66%) and 
358 stock deals.23 We also include dummy variables to control for industry 
diversification (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990), domestic deals (Rossi and Volpin, 
2004), and deals aimed at delisting the target firm. When the bidder wants to take the 
target company private, it needs all of the target’s minority shareholders to accept its 
offer or, at least, it needs enough shares to force a squeeze-out bid. Thus, the premium 
offered should be higher, leading to larger abnormal returns. Target firms share the 
same industry (two-digit SIC codes) with the acquiring firms in 48.29% of the sample 
                                                 
22
 We use this definition of run-up with CARs in the event window [-2, +2]. As a general definition, we 
compute run-ups from 42 days to the day before the beginning of the event window being considered. 
23
 The remaining 44 deals are deals with mixed forms of payment—i.e., neither cash nor stock reaches 
80% of the deal value. 
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observations (567 out of 1,174). Domestic deals represent the vast majority of the 
increase-in-ownership deals (72%). Deals aimed at taking the target private are more 
than 80% of the sample. 
Almost 65% (238 out of 1,058) of the deals are carried out with a tender offer 
based on the information collected from Lexis/Nexis.24 Only 238 out of the 1,058 
(22.5%) of transactions are merger deals. While mergers and tender offers are the most 
common forms of increase-in-ownership deals, these deals can take other forms. In fact, 
the controlling shareholder may increase its ownership stake by buying out another 
block holder in the company (block purchases). Finally, the controlling shareholder may 
increase its stake by purchasing shares in the open market without launching a tender 
offer for the target’s share (open-market transactions). However, the roles of block 
purchases (10%) and, especially, open-market transactions (1.23%) is of residual 
importance. Table 3 presents the pair-wise correlations between the stock market 
development, economic development, and media pressure variables, respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We conduct a preliminary event-study analysis to evaluate firms' stock price 
reactions to the announcement of an increase-in-ownership acquisition, and we 
estimate the market model using daily returns to adjust for systematic risk (Table 4).25 
The market reaction for target firms is positive and statistically significant, with an 
average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 11.95% in the five-day (-2, +2) interval 
                                                 
24
 Note that we do not use the form of the deal reported by Thomson ONE Banker because, after 
comparison with newspaper articles on Lexis/Nexis, we found that the item was to an extent unreliable. 
25
 The estimation period is a 200-day interval from day -240 to day -41 with respect to the event day. 
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surrounding the acquisition announcement. The average CAR is 13.28% in the event 
window (-5, +5) and 14.51% in the event window (-10, +10). The average return in 
increase-in-ownership transactions is lower than the return for M&A announcements 
that lead to a change of control, which is around 16% in the U.S. (Andrade et al., 2001) 
and about 12.28% in Europe (Martynova and Renneboog, 2006).26 However, the 
magnitude of the targets’ reactions in increase-in-ownership acquisitions is still 
economically significant. Hence, even though such transactions do not result in a control 
change, shareholders of target firms gain a considerable abnormal return. This positive 
and significant increase conflicts with the view that increase-in-ownership transactions 
are merely designed to take advantage of the target’s minority shareholders.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 also breaks down the sample according to the target firm’s country. 
While the mean and median of the full sample are positive and significant over the 5-
day announcement period, looking at the CARs at the country level immediately reveals 
that large differences exist between countries. Average CARs in the (-2, +2) interval go 
from a minimum of -28.99% in Russia (only one observation) to a maximum of 29.60% in 
neighboring Latvia (again, only one observation).27 While these extreme values may be 
due to the limited number of observations available for some countries, cross-country 
variations are also seen in countries with more observations such as France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (2.31%, 7.71%, and 26.03%, respectively). 
                                                 
26
 This result (12.28%) refers to the event window (-1, +1). The CAR in the (-1, +1) event window is 10.57% 
in our sample. Abnormal returns are 14.73% in the event window (-5, +5) in Martynova and Renneboog 
(2006), very close to our estimate.  
27
 Honk Kong has the highest average CAR (about 33%) in the event windows (-5, +5) and (-10, +10). 
Russia has the lowest CAR in all the event windows. 
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The cross-country dispersion of returns raises the issue of whether 
characteristics at the country level can explain the magnitude of these differences. In 
the next section, we focus on stock market development and test, using both univariate 
and multivariate analyses, whether it plays a significant role in explaining target minority 
shareholders’ returns. We will first compute the CARs enjoyed by targets. Previous 
literature has documented that deal and firm characteristics also have a significant 
impact on abnormal returns around acquisition announcements; hence, these factors 
will be considered along with the proxies of stock market development in the 
multivariate cross-sectional regressions analysis. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Univariate Results 
Table 5 tests the relationship between target returns and stock market 
development. We divide our sample by stock market development based on the 
measures discussed above and examine in a univariate type of analysis the returns of 
targets in developed versus undeveloped markets. In Panel A of Table 4, we use 
turnover over GDP and turnover over market capitalization as measures of stock market 
development. Targets are ranked in descending order for each of the two stock market 
development proxies and divided into four groups of equal size. Targets belonging to 
the bottom (top) quartile are considered as the low- (high-) development targets. 
Targets belonging to quartiles two and three are categorized as median. While target 
shareholders experience positive abnormal returns in the overall sample (11.95%), we 
find that they gain 17.50% in high-development markets as compared with 7.12% in 
 18 
low-development markets during the 5 days around the acquisition announcement. 
Their mean difference is 10.38% and it is strongly significant at the 1% significance level, 
which highlights the importance of stock market development in driving target returns.  
When we employ the turnover over market capitalization as a proxy of stock 
market development, the results are similar to those obtained using turnover over GDP: 
targets in developed markets earn a 5-day CAR of 14.25% as compared with 9.50% in 
less-developed markets. Their mean return difference (4.75%) is again statistically 
significant, which strongly corroborates the view that stock market development is a 
significant driving force of target returns. Our results are consistent when we use the 
event windows (-5, +5) and (-10, +10). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
3.2. Multivariate Results 
The event-study analysis shows that the reaction to the announcement of an 
increase-in-ownership deal differs across countries, and the findings in the univariate 
tests signify the importance of the level of the country’s stock market development in 
shaping the target’s returns. To better examine the impact of stock market development 
on targets’ performance around acquisition announcements, we adopt a multiple 
regression framework, in which we employ stock market development measures and 
various country, target and deal characteristic controls as independent variables.  
 CARs are regressed against country-level variables to determine whether these 
variables affect the premiums offered to minority shareholders. Table 6 reports the 
results of these regressions using CAR in three different event windows—(-2, +2), (-5, 
+5), and (-10, +10)—to take into account the different efficiency of the stock markets to 
 19 
incorporate information.28 In all regressions, we report the results of the two stock 
market development variables along with all other financial and economic development 
control variables. The turnover over GDP positively affects the targets’ abnormal 
returns, as the coefficient carries a positive sign and is highly significant at the 1% level. 
The effect of turnover over GDP is also economically significant: a change of one-
standard-deviation in turnover over GDP produces an increase of 3.96% in the abnormal 
returns around acquisition announcements in Column (1), of 3.90% in Column (2), and 
of 3.76% in Column (3). The positive coefficient indicates that a larger and more active 
stock market leads to higher returns enjoyed by minority shareholders. In fact, active 
markets signal, first, that people actually invest and participate in the stock market, 
directly and indirectly, and second, that market participants are able to react quickly to 
new information. Thus, they are more likely to punish controlling shareholders who try 
to underpay minority investors (La Porta et al., 2000).  
The same results are obtained for the other proxy of stock market development, 
turnover over market capitalization. In regressions (2), (4), and (6), the coefficient that 
represents stock market development is positive and significant. Moreover, for this 
variable, the impact is economically relevant: a change of one standard deviation in 
turnover over market capitalization increases the CAR by 2.11%, 1.87%, and 1.93%, in 
the event windows (-2, +2), (-5, +5), (-10, +10), respectively. The coefficient for English 
legal origin, the proxy for the quality of the legal protection between investors among 
countries (La Porta et al., 1998), is also positive and highly significant. In contrast to the 
proxies for stock market development, the private credit variable is insignificant. The 
                                                 
28
 In Tables 6 through 11, robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level. Time 
effects are also included in all regressions.  
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economic variables and shareholder protection, represented by the DLLS index variable, 
are generally insignificant for all measures of stock market development. On the other 
hand, media pressure has a negative and significant coefficient in longer event windows 
when turnover over GDP is used as proxy for stock market development (in Columns 3 
and 5). This result is surprising because it is more likely to expect a positive relationship 
between people’s access to news and the loss of reputation due to an attempt to 
expropriate minority shareholders with a low offer as in Dyck et al. (2008). However, the 
media variable is not significant in regressions using the other proxy for stock market 
development (turnover over market capitalization, in Columns 4 and 6). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We include the firm and deal characteristics discussed in Section 2.2, along with 
stock market development indicators, in the regressions of Tables 7, 8, and 9. In these 
regressions, we control whether the relationship between target returns and stock 
market development is driven by correlation with some of the various deal- and firm-
specific factors suggested by the related literature. Consistent with the results in Table 
6, the coefficients that represent stock market development are positive and strongly 
significant in Table 7. More specifically, the coefficient of Turnover/GDP carries a 
positive sign and is significant at the 1% level, while Turnover/Market Capitalization 
carries a coefficient of 0.0383 and is significant at the 5% level. A change in one standard 
deviation in the two proxies of stock market development produces economically 
significant increases in the market reaction around the acquisition announcement. More 
specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in Turnover/GDP raises abnormal returns 
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by 3.70% in Column (1), while the same change in Turnover/Market Capitalization 
increases abnormal return by slightly less than 2% (1.92%).  
The English origin coefficient is also positive (0.0657) and strongly significant. 
Among firm characteristics, the DLLS index and the stock-price performance variable in 
the year preceding the increase-in-ownership acquisition have a significantly positive 
relationship with target returns in all regressions. A good stock-price performance in the 
year before the acquisition decreases the abnormal return, a result that is consistent 
with the fact that increase-in-ownership deals are more valuable for minority 
shareholders in poorly performing companies.29 Moreover, when the company is 
performing well, the stock price level is relatively high, and so there is less room for 
large premiums. Further, consistent with the literature, the market prefers cash deals to 
stock deals because a cash payment eliminates the uncertainty about the offer value. In 
addition, the market reaction is stronger when the motivation of the deal aims at 
delisting the target firm. Consistent with Bris and Cabolis (2008) and Rossi and Volpin 
(2004), domestic deals exhibit a significantly negative relationship with target returns. 
Finally, the main results for stock market development variables for the event windows 
(-5, 5) and (-10, 10) are confirmed. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to the 
ones in 5-day CAR regressions, which also assures the economic significance of the 
variables.30  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                 
29
 In unreported analysis, we also run the same set of regressions, removing either the stock price 
performance in the previous year or the target run-up CARs. In fact, for some observations these variables 
may partially overlap. We find that when we include just one of these two variables the results are 
qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 6. 
30
 A one-standard-deviation increase for Turnover/GDP in event windows (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) produces 
a change of about 4% in the abnormal returns. The change is between 1.84% and 2.31% for 
Turnover/Market Capitalization. 
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We control for ownership structure effects in Table 8, including dummies for the 
type of controlling shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999) find that there are more family 
(widely held) firms in countries with poor (good) investor protection, and Faccio and 
Lang (2002) document that family firms are more common in continental Europe than in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, according to the literature, families seem 
to value control more than corporate shareholders, either because they value the 
opportunities to consume perquisites more than corporate majority shareholders 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) or because some benefits of control, such as the pride of 
running the company they, or a family member, founded, cannot be transferred 
(Holderness and Sheehan, 1988). Hence, it may be possible that the lower 
announcement returns for targets in some countries are driven by differences in the 
type of controlling shareholder.  
The results remain consistent as both stock market development variables are 
positive and strongly significant when the ownership structure control variables are 
added. For the regression in column (1), a one-standard-deviation increase in 
Turnover/GDP raises abnormal returns by 3.75%, while the same change in 
Turnover/Market Capitalization increases abnormal return by 1.84% in Column (2). 
Among the ownership structure variables, the dummies for bidders controlled by widely 
held firms or widely held financial institutions, and when the controlling shareholder of 
the bidding firm is a foundation or employees, exhibit a significantly negative 
relationship with target returns in the majority of the regressions. While the negative 
coefficient for bidders whose controlling shareholder is a widely-held firm, a foundation, 
or employees, can be attributed to large shareholders’ monitoring of managers (Shleifer 
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and Vishny, 1997), it is not clear why widely held financial institutions offer lower 
premiums. Consistent with industrial widely held firms, these corporations do not have 
large shareholders. Thus, monitoring by a large shareholder cannot explain this result. 
The results are consistent when the two other alternative windows are employed. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Overall, multivariate cross-sectional regressions strongly indicate that developed 
stock markets are a key determinant of the target firm’s announcement returns. The 
empirical evidence suggests that targets’ minority investors reap greater benefits in 
terms of market reaction in countries with developed stock markets. In other words, 
well-developed stock markets favor minority shareholders and enable them to extract 
larger gains.  
 
4. The Impact of Deal Form  
We have not yet considered the form of the deal. As indicated in Table 2, tender 
offers are the most common deal forms. The form of the deal has been documented as 
a major factor in determining target returns because there is more room for 
expropriation in mergers than in tender offers. In fact, even under U.S. (Delaware) law, 
tender offers made by controlling shareholders are subject to a less-demanding 
standard of review than negotiated mergers (Bates et al., 2006). Bae et al. (2002) 
documents how mergers can be used to expropriate minority shareholders in Korea. 
Hence, in the case of mergers, a smaller reaction for target companies is expected. The 
prediction for the coefficient of the block purchase dummy is negative. In fact, with a 
block purchase, the target firm loses a minority block holder who could have power and 
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incentive to monitor the controlling shareholder. The sign of the coefficient of the open-
market purchase is more difficult to predict, and it is also affected by the timing of the 
purchases. To control for these effects, we run regressions by adding dummies for the 
deal form.31 
In Table 9 we present the results of these regressions for event window (-2, +2).32 
Our two stock market development indicators remain constantly positive and strongly 
significant even when we add the variables of the deal forms. The dummy for a merger 
deal is negative and significant in all regressions, even when we control for the method 
of payment (we include the variable Cash in the regression). Thus, the coefficient 
confirms that mergers tend to be less favorable for target shareholders than tender 
offers. The same result is obtained for block and open-market transactions, which are 
significantly negative in the great majority of the regressions. This finding indicates that 
target shareholders are better off when the deal takes the form of a tender offer as 
expected, but stock market development still matters even after controlling for the form 
of the deal. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
5. Robustness Checks  
5.1. Regressions with Country-Fixed Effects 
                                                 
31
 In unreported results, we also test the impact of the form of the deal in a univariate type of analysis. 
Consistent with the view that mergers are less beneficial for minority shareholders than tender offers, 
target firms’ CARs for mergers are lower than CARs for tender offers—8.36% vs. 15.34% in the event 
window (-2, +2)—and the difference is statistically significant. Abnormal returns around increase-in-
ownership acquisitions carried out through block trades and block trades followed by a compulsory offer 
are even lower (6.60%, and 5.77%, respectively). The announcement of an open-market acquisition does 
not impact the target firm’s stock price (-0.07%), which suggests that the market does not expect any 
follow-up offer. 
32
 In unreported analysis, we also find remarkably similar results for the other two event windows.  
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By using clustered standard errors at the country level, there could be concerns 
due to the presence of unobservable country heterogeneity and omitted regressors. In 
order to alleviate these concerns, we re-run the regressions of Tables 6 and 7 using 
country-fixed effects in addition to clustered standard errors. From these regressions, 
we remove time-invariant variables, like the English Origin, and the DLLS index. We 
present the results in Tables 10 and 11, which confirm that the strong positive effect of 
a developed stock market still holds even when we include country-fixed effects. 
 
[Insert Tables 10 & 11 about here]  
5.2. Deal Motivations 
Finally, we also collect data from Lexis/Nexis regarding the motivations that led to 
increase-in-ownership deals for 1,058 deals. We classify motivations in the following 
eight categories: block-holders’ exits (50), controlling shareholders who prefer further 
control over targets (156), the desire to be able to respond to competitive pressures 
(87), controlling shareholders who prefer to take targets private (93), the desire to 
consolidate/simplify the group structure (406), targets’ bad performance (147), 
bidders/parents’ bad performance (47), synergies/efficiency gains (61), and pressure by 
shareholders (7). This classification relies on public information provided by newspapers 
and newswire articles found on Lexis/Nexis. In an unreported regression analysis, we 
include dummies for the deal’s motivations as described above. All stock market 
development variables are still positive and strongly significant, while dummies for the 
reasons behind the deal appear to have an insignificant impact on target firm’s returns. 
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5.3. Are the Bidder and Parent Companies the Same Firm? 
One of the major differences in increase-in-ownership acquisitions is related to 
which firm actually carries out the acquisition. Often, parent companies do not directly 
buy out or increase their stakes in the listed subsidiaries but instead use another firm as 
the acquisition vehicle. This strategy may be used to make the transaction less 
transparent and to transfer value to controlling shareholders (Bae et al., 2002; Faccio 
and Stolin, 2006). Thus, we examine whether the results differ when we control for the 
cases in which the parent company (as recorded by Thomson ONE Banker) makes the 
acquisition directly.  
 Parent companies are the bidding firms in 651 out of the 1,174 deals in our 
sample (55.45%). Looking at the results (not reported for reasons of space), there is no 
significant difference for target shareholders if the parent company conducts the 
acquisition or not: the abnormal return is 12.53% when the bidder is the parent 
company and 11.23% when the bidder is not the parent company in the event window (-
2, +2). When included in the regressions model, the coefficient for the direct acquisition 
is not statistically significant in all regressions, while the results for the other variables 
are identical to those shown in the main analysis.  
 
5.4. Raising Equity After Increase-in-Ownership Transactions 
The possibility that the controlling shareholders may have to raise external capital in 
public markets in the near future may limit the extent to which they are willing to take 
advantage of minority shareholders. This reputation argument, also discussed by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), is based on the fact that firms that are known for unpleasant 
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treatment of minority investors may face difficulties in selling their securities to new 
investors. However, this threat of future punishment is only possible if a well-
functioning stock market exists in the country. 
To investigate this issue empirically, we downloaded all equity issues (including 
SEOs, IPOs, private placements, and convertible issues) in the period from 1989 to 2008 
from the Thomson ONE Banker “Equity Issues” database. We manually controlled 
whether the bidding firm (and the parent firm) sold equity to the public in the 24-month 
(36-month) period after the increase-in-ownership acquisition.33  
Overall, we have 211 (251) bidders that issued equity in the 24 (36) months 
following the increase-in-ownership transactions (18% for 24 months, and 21.4% for 36 
months). In unreported analysis, we find that firms targeted by issuing bidders realized 
an average 11.2% in the event window (-2, +2). However, this abnormal return is not 
statistically (and economically) different from that reported for non-issuing firms in the 
same event window (12.13%). Similar results are obtained for event windows (-5, +5), 
and (-10, +10). We do not observe any significant difference between the two groups 
using the 36-month interval. This result is not due to a possible IPOs effect. In fact, we 
have a very limited number of bidders that went public in the 24 (36) months after the 
acquisitions (7 and 10, respectively). 
We also include an equity-issue dummy in the regression models of Table 7. 
Contrary to the reputation-based explanation, the coefficient of this variable is never 
statistically significant. Our main results are not affected by the inclusion of these 
                                                 
33
 While arbitrary, the length of these periods are reasonably short to assume that the large shareholders 
knew at the time of the acquisition that they would have to raise equity later, and long enough to give 
time for firms to actually make new issues.  
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variables. Thus, the larger return realized by target shareholders in countries with 
developed stock markets is not related to the likelihood of raising new equity in the near 
future.34 
 
5.5. Creditor Rights 
In an additional robustness check, we use the creditor rights index provided by 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) as another proxy for the quality of the legal 
system. The advantage of this index is that it provides time series data on creditor rights 
for 129 countries over the period 1978–2002.35 In unreported regressions, we find that 
the creditor rights index is never statistically significant. A prominent explanation for 
this result could be that shareholders’ interest may diverge from those of creditors, as 
the capital structure literature confirms.36 Thus, a higher protection for creditors may be 
detrimental to shareholders in general, and this effect offsets, at least partially, the 
improvement in the legal system. The coefficients of our proxies for market 
development are again strongly positive and significant in these regressions.  
 
5.6. Institutional Investors’ Ownership 
 The observed positive relationship between stock market development 
measures and target firm returns could be due to omitted variables. For example, in 
                                                 
34
 As an additional robustness check we also take into account the equity issues made by the parent 
company (as reported on Thomson ONE Banker). With this new definition, we have 249 (302) deals 
followed by an equity issue made by either the bidding firm or its parent company. We find that even in 
this case the abnormal reactions of the two groups (issuing bidders vs. non-issuing bidders) are similar. 
We do not report the result for the sake of brevity. 
35
 The data are available on Andrei Shleifer’s Web site. We use 2002 data for the years not covered by the 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) data set. The only countries without creditor rights data included in 
our sample are Luxembourg and Estonia.  
36
 See for example Harris and Raviv (1991) for an excellent survey. 
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developed stock markets, institutional investors may play an active governance role. If 
they are present in firms involved in the deals, they may have a higher bargaining power 
and therefore secure a higher compensation. Using the average institutional ownership 
at country level for 27 countries provided over the period 2000–2005 provided in 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Massa, Ferreira, and Matos (2009), we control for 
institutional investors’ ownership.37 In an unreported analysis, we find that our results 
do not change if we include this variable in our regression models. More specifically, we 
find an insignificant relationship between target CARs and institutional ownership, while 
the coefficients of both stock market development indicators remain positive and 
strongly significant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between stock market development and 
announcement returns to target firm’s minority shareholders in increase-in-ownership 
acquisitions. The evidence supports the view that target firms’ shareholders do not 
enjoy the same privileges everywhere. While on average positive, abnormal returns 
differ greatly across countries, and the level of stock market development appears to 
play a significant role in driving targets’ returns.  
We use a global sample of 46 countries, which includes 1,174 such deals, and we 
measure stock market development based on two alternative proxies: turnover over 
GDP and turnover over market capitalization. Our findings indicate that, when the 
company’s controlling shareholders engage in increase-in-ownership acquisitions, 
                                                 
37
 Institutional ownership is defined as the average of total institutional ownership as a percentage of 
market capitalization over the period 2000–2005.  
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minority shareholders greatly benefit from the country’s stock market development. 
These results hold when we control for several deal and target characteristics and have 
implications for policymakers. One of the policymakers’ top priorities should be to 
improve stock market participation and increase market liquidity—i.e., develop an 
efficient stock market. In fact, our results document that a developed stock market 
serves as an effective disciplinary mechanism even for a bidder that already controls the 
target company.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Turnover over GDP Ratio of the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges in the 
year before the deal in the target country to the country’s GDP. The variable is 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Turnover over Market 
Capitalization 
Ratio of the value of the trades of domestic equities on domestic exchanges in the 
year before the deal in the target country to the country’s domestic market 
capitalization. The variable is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
English Origin Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the legal origin of the target firm 
country is English common law (LLSV, 1998) 
DLLS Index Djankov et al. (2008) revised anti-director-rights index.  
Log GDP Log of the target’s country GDP per capita (US$ 2000) in the year before the deal. 
The variable is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Private Credit The ratio of credit from deposit-taking financial institutions to the private sector 
(IFS lines 22d and 42d) to GDP (IFS line 99b), expressed as a percentage, for the 
year before the transactions. IFS is the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
GDP Growth Annual growth rate of target’s country GDP in the year before the deal. The 
variable is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
TV Percentage of households with television (%) at the end of the year before the 
deal. The variable is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
Domestic Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bidder and the target belong to 
the same country. 
Diversifying  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bidder and the target belong to 
a different industry. 
Size  The firm’s market value of equity in US $ at the end of the year before the deal 
(Worldscope Item WC07210).  
Collateral  Ratio of tangible assets to total assets at the end of the year before the deal 
(WC02501/WC02999).  
ROA Return on assets in the year before the deal (WC08326).  
Cash Holding Ratio of cash plus tradable securities over total assets at the end of the year before 
the deal (WC02001/WC02999).  
Leverage Ratio of book value of financial debt as a percentage of the book value of total assets 
at the end of the year before the deal (WC03251/WC02999).  
Market-to-book Ratio of market value of equity in US$ (WC07210) divided by common equity in 
US$ at the end of the year before the deal (WC07220).  
Stock-Price Performance Stock-price performance over the year before the deal (WC05070).  
Own. Before  Percentage of the target firm’s equity held by the bidder before the transaction.  
Own. After Percentage of the target firm’s equity held by the bidder after the transaction. 
Cash Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the method of payment in the deal is 
cash (at least 80% of the deal value).  
Taken Private Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the deal aims at delisting the target 
firm.  
Run-up Cumulative abnormal return in the period immediately before the acquisition 
announcements. The run-up period is (-42, -3) when the event window (-2, +2) is 
used, (-42, -6) when the event window (-5, 5) is used, and finally (-42, -11) when 
the event window (-10, +10) is used as the dependent variable in the regression.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions (cont.) 
Variable Definition 
Family Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a family. 
State Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is the state. 
Financial  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a financial institution.  
Cont. by Widely Held Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a widely held firm (non-financial). 
Cont. by Widely Held 
financial  
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a widely held financial institution. 
Miscellaneous Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a foundation, employees, etc. It is a residual category. 
Widely held Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the bidding firm is a widely held 
firm. 
Widely Held Financial Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder of the 
bidding firm is a widely held financial institution. 
Merger Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, according to Lexis/Nexis articles, the 
deal form is a merger. 
Block Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, according to Lexis/Nexis articles, the 
deal form is a block purchase. 
Open market Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, according to Lexis/Nexis articles, the 
deal form is an open-market purchase. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable taking value 1 if, according to Lexis/Nexis articles, the deal form is 
a tender offer. 
Block/Tender Offer Dummy variable taking value 1 if, according to Lexis/Nexis articles, the deal form is 
a block purchase immediately followed by a mandatory tender offer.  
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Table 1: Sample Construction 
The table reports the steps used to build the database. Deals are subdivided according to the target firm’s 
region. All mergers and acquisitions are from the Thomson ONE Banker database. 
 
Steps Total Observations 
  
All acquisitions from Thomson ONE Banker Mergers and 
acquisitions database that satisfy the following criteria: 
- Country is between those reported below: 
Europe: Austria,Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech R., Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal,  Romania, Russia, Spain, Slovak R., 
Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Ukraine. 
Australia & New Zealand: Australia, New Zealand. 
Africa: South Africa. 
Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
Americas: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, U.S.A., Venezuela 
- Target is a  public firm 
- Announcement date from 01.01.1989 to 12.31.2005 
- Deal value > $1m 
- The deal is completed 
- Owned after > 30%  
- % of target equity acquired at least 5%  
 Total 18,213 
  
  
Deals lost because:  
Target and bidder do not have the same ultimate parent company 
according to Thomson One Banker -15,742 
Total  2,471 
  
Deals that failed double-check with Lexis-Nexis -937 
Bidder’s ownership before the acquisition is above 90% -75 
Increase-in-ownership deals 1,459 
No Datastream data -285 
  
Increase-in-ownership deals included in the analysis 1,174 
  
Countries Searched     59  
Countries with observations included in the analysis 47 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics about all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable definitions are in the Appendix .  
 
 
    Mean     Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
N. Obs 
Country level Variables       
Turnover over GDP 0.6241 0.4345 0.0047 3.2630 0.6422 1174 
Turnover over Mkt. Cap 0.7151 0.6054 0.0094 3.4432 0.5244 1174 
Market Cap (% over GDP) 0.7874 0.6534 0.0536 3.2201 0.5080 1137 
English origin 0.4719     1174 
Private Credit 1.0708 1.0857 0.1050 2.0032 0.4400 1156 
Log GDP 9.6964 9.9987 5.7813 10.7424 1.0055 1174 
GDP Growth (%) 2.7784 2.9200 -10.8900 11.7300 2.4424 1174 
Televisions  91.3608 96.7500 13.5800 101.4700 13.8531 1091 
DLLS Index 3.5472 3.5000 1.0000 5.0000 0.9101 1166 
Firm level Variables       
Size 1177.52 220.74 582.00 55175.09 3941.89 868 
Collateral 0.3118 0.2745 0.0000 0.9827 0.2556 867 
ROA 2.2382 3.9400 -1013.6200 149.1600 37.5579 854 
Cash holding 0.1372 0.0758 0.0000 0.9872 0.1648 794 
Leverage 0.1210 0.0582 0.0000 0.9125 0.1540 873 
Market-to-book 3.2986 1.3848 0.0066 563.4595 22.0640 845 
Stock Price Performance 0.1029 0.0000 -0.9746 8.4787 0.6794 861 
Owned Directly Before (%) 60.23 62.90 0.00 90.00 21.11 1174 
Owned Directly After (%) 93.06 100.00 34.00 100.00 13.16 1174 
Family 0.4209     1100 
State 0.1091     1100 
Financial 0.1136     1100 
Contr. WH 0.0473     1100 
Contr. Fin. 0.0382     1100 
Miscellaneous 0.0191     1100 
Widely Held Fin. 0.0418     1100 
Deal specific Variables       
Domestic 0.7206     1174 
Diversifying 0.4830     1174 
Cash deal 0.6576     1174 
Taken Private 0.8024     1174 
Run-up 0.0388 0.0260 -2.4982 3.4130 0.2579 1174 
Block 0.0992     1058 
Merger 0.2250     1058 
Open market transactions 0.0123     1058 
Tender Offer 0.6465     1058 
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Table 3 . Correlations Between Country-level Variables  
The table presents the pair wise correlations between country variables. The variables are defined in the Appendix. The symbol * denotes that the pair 
wise correlation is statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
Turnover 
over GDP 
Turnover 
over Mkt 
Cap. 
Common       
Law   
Dummy 
Market 
Cap (% 
GDP) 
Private 
Credit Log (GDP) 
GDP 
Growth TV DLLS Index 
Turnover over GDP 1         
Turnover over Mkt Cap. 0.6171* 1        
Common Law Dummy 0.3464* 0.1309* 1       
Market cap (% GDP) 0.6565* 0.0890* 0.3978* 1      
Private Credit 0.5365* 0.1360* 0.3016* 0.5498* 1     
Log (GDP) 0.2774* -0.1034* -0.0314 0.2841* 0.5829* 1    
GDP growth 0.1600* 0.1005* 0.3030* 0.2047* -0.0960* -0.2556* 1   
TV 0.1543* -0.2391* -0.0587 0.1613* 0.4110* 0.7949* -0.1879* 1  
DLLS Index 0.0322 -0.0109 0.4302* 0.1671* -0.0541 -0.3150* 0.0670* -0.2860* 1 
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Table 4. Abnormal Returns at Country Level  
The table presents the event study results by country for the whole sample of targets involved in increase-
in-ownership transactions during the period 1989–2005. The 13 countries not included in the table do not 
have any observation in the sample. These are the following: Bulgaria, Croatia, Iceland, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovenia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Vietnam. 
 
 CAR(-2, +2) CAR(-5, +5) CAR(-10, +10)  
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median # Obs. 
Argentina 12.42% 11.06% 16.61% 16.99% 16.26% 12.84% 12 
Australia 15.22% 9.68% 15.10% 13.97% 15.71% 14.75% 49 
Austria 16.16% 6.14% 18.95% 7.63% 24.58% 14.78% 7 
Belgium 11.83% 7.61% 13.27% 8.74% 14.79% 11.11% 18 
Brazil 9.29% 2.92% 9.44% 2.82% 11.70% 4.32% 32 
Canada 15.94% 13.49% 17.87% 14.80% 18.63% 14.90% 66 
Chile 14.16% 7.21% 19.75% 13.83% 19.04% 13.14% 10 
China 3.36% 2.98% 1.95% 2.35% 5.90% 5.12% 9 
Colombia -10.69% 5.65% -8.79% 9.25% -5.71% 13.01% 5 
Czech Rep. 7.73% 0.24% 8.06% 6.89% 7.56% 4.59% 6 
Denmark 12.00% 5.04% 13.85% 5.74% 13.24% 5.56% 5 
Estonia 2.37% 2.37% 6.18% 6.18% -5.14% -5.14% 1 
Finland 8.82% 3.83% 8.63% 4.13% 8.30% 7.16% 12 
France 2.31% 0.25% 2.51% 0.49% 10.73% 4.32% 94 
Germany 7.71% 5.86% 9.51% 6.86% 10.94% 10.94% 38 
Greece 1.42% 0.77% 1.67% 2.94% 4.16% 4.13% 4 
Hong Kong 26.49% 20.27% 33.04% 30.81% 36.28% 32.51% 37 
India 11.29% 10.08% 13.88% 10.49% 17.88% 20.18% 34 
Indonesia 5.69% 3.69% 4.27% 4.53% 7.52% 7.99% 7 
Ireland-Rep 15.72% 15.72% 22.72% 22.72% 22.71% 22.71% 1 
Israel 16.70% 17.32% 17.44% 17.05% 12.75% 10.86% 9 
Italy 10.28% 4.96% 12.74% 8.90% 16.27% 12.77% 58 
Japan 6.78% 5.91% 8.68% 8.50% 7.53% 6.57% 159 
Latvia 29.60% 29.60% 23.24% 23.24% 18.93% 18.93% 1 
Luxembourg 0.26% 0.01% -2.17% 2.25% -0.60% 6.69% 6 
Malaysia 9.57% 6.87% 9.65% 7.39% 13.17% 10.66% 16 
Mexico 3.38% -0.46% 2.29% -0.96% 4.16% 2.74% 6 
Netherlands 11.35% 5.88% 15.66% 6.64% 14.79% 8.23% 17 
New Zealand 10.37% 9.29% 9.68% 8.81% 10.02% 11.16% 28 
Norway 12.54% 9.66% 19.34% 26.66% 22.40% 23.47% 6 
Peru -1.27% -0.18% -0.55% -0.17% 0.62% 0.22% 3 
Philippines 9.00% 6.64% 10.51% 14.01% 10.84% 14.06% 3 
Poland 0.60% 0.79% -1.04% -2.79% 5.51% 4.50% 15 
Portugal 4.43% 2.62% 2.88% 1.07% 1.16% -0.13% 16 
Russian Fed -28.99% -28.99% -33.37% -33.37% -31.10% -31.10% 1 
Singapore 14.73% 12.78% 17.25% 15.17% 18.97% 16.96% 35 
Slovak Rep 4.95% 4.95% 1.55% 1.55% 2.13% 2.13% 1 
South Africa 7.98% 4.76% 8.26% 11.47% 9.45% 11.05% 25 
South Korea 11.58% 5.51% 11.21% 12.57% 6.51% 8.89% 9 
Spain 10.40% 7.74% 11.89% 13.58% 10.71% 13.94% 21 
Sweden 15.11% 13.19% 14.86% 10.67% 15.58% 10.63% 24 
Switzerland 16.95% 14.58% 16.79% 14.01% 19.24% 16.81% 13 
Thailand 13.83% 7.29% 15.73% 17.49% 12.55% 15.58% 10 
Turkey -14.82% -14.82% -1.99% -1.99% 17.40% 17.40% 1 
United 
Kingdom 26.03% 14.20% 27.00% 15.22% 27.57% 17.99% 37 
United 
States 18.45% 13.18% 19.46% 15.93% 18.82% 16.93% 207 
        
Total 11.95% 7.27% 13.28% 9.25% 14.51% 11.20% 1174 
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Table 5. Abnormal Returns & Stock Market Development   
The table analyzes the relationship between cumulative abnormal returns in the event windows (-2, +2), (-
5, +5) and (-10, +10) and stock market development proxies described in Section 2.1 for the whole sample 
of targets involved in increase-in-ownership transactions during the period 1989–2005.  
 
Panel A: Turnover/GDP  
    
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
    
Full Sample 11.95% 13.28% 14.51% 
 1174 1174 1174 
    
Bottom Quartile (Q1) 7.12% 7.85% 10.37% 
 294 294 294 
Median Quartiles (Q2) 11.47% 12.86% 13.77% 
 574 574 574 
Top Quartile (Q3) 17.50% 19.30% 19.89% 
 306 306 306 
    
Test for difference between top and bottom quartiles 
(Q3)-(Q1) 10.38% 11.45% 9.52% 
t-stat 5.9856 6.1605 4.7555 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    
Panel B: Turnover/Market Capitalization 
    
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
    
Full sample 11.95% 13.28% 14.51% 
 1174 1174 1174 
    
Bottom Quartile (Q1) 9.50% 10.66% 12.71% 
 294 294 294 
Median Quartiles (Q2) 11.97% 13.49% 15.10% 
 571 571 571 
Top Quartile (Q3) 14.25% 15.40% 15.15% 
 309 309 309 
    
Test for difference between top and bottom quartiles  
(Q3)-(Q1) 4.75% 4.74% 2.44% 
t-stat 2.7834 2.6083 1.2329 
p-value 0.0056 0.0093 0.2181 
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Table 6. Regressions with Country-Level Variables 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the targets’ 
cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All regressions include time-fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. Clustered robust standard errors 
at the country level are in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 
       
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.1884* -0.2441** -0.2187** -0.2650** -0.1351 -0.1897 
 [0.1017] [0.1093] [0.0966] [0.1089] [0.1113] [0.1213]    
Turnover over GDP 0.0648***  0.0629***  0.0645***              
 [0.0103]  [0.0123]  [0.0144]              
Turnover over Mkt. Cap  0.0438***  0.0375**  0.0430**  
  [0.0131]  [0.0151]  [0.0162]    
English Origin 0.0728*** 0.0802*** 0.0685*** 0.0773*** 0.0492*** 0.0567*** 
 [0.0151] [0.0155] [0.0164] [0.0173] [0.0152] [0.0158]    
Market Cap (% over GDP) -0.0225 0.0231 -0.0324 0.0109 -0.0152 0.03 
 [0.0202] [0.0194] [0.0246] [0.0227] [0.0272] [0.0227]    
Private Credit -0.0068 -0.0052 0.0051 0.0077 -0.0337 -0.032 
 [0.0183] [0.0183] [0.0211] [0.0210] [0.0205] [0.0202]    
Log GDP 0.0273* 0.0286* 0.0381** 0.0398** 0.0398** 0.0411**  
 [0.0157] [0.0165] [0.0148] [0.0157] [0.0166] [0.0174]    
GDP Growth -0.003 -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0031 0 -0.0006 
 [0.0035] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0031] [0.0034] [0.0032]    
Televisions  -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0015* -0.0012 -0.0020** -0.0016 
 [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0010]    
DLLS Index 0.0157* 0.0094 0.0195** 0.0129 0.0158 0.0095 
 [0.0083] [0.0087] [0.0084] [0.0088] [0.0101] [0.0101]    
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.1117 0.1035 0.0962 0.0882 0.0544 0.0488 
Observations 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 1035 
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Table 7. Regressions with Country- and Firm-Level Variables  
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include time-
fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -0.2396** -0.2876** -0.2508** -0.2987** -0.1781 -0.2371 
 [0.1130] [0.1208] [0.1116] [0.1144] [0.1506] [0.1500] 
Turnover over 
GDP 0.0577***  0.0598***  0.0614***  
 [0.0105]  [0.0119]  [0.0148]  
Turnover over 
Mkt. Cap  0.0366**  0.0367**  0.0440*** 
  [0.0142]  [0.0138]  [0.0152] 
English Origin 0.0492*** 0.0568*** 0.0586*** 0.0668*** 0.0304 0.0371* 
 [0.0138] [0.0146] [0.0164] [0.0165] [0.0200] [0.0200] 
Market Cap (% 
over GDP) -0.0252 0.0171 -0.0486* -0.005 -0.0294 0.0166 
 [0.0235] [0.0213] [0.0271] [0.0269] [0.0340] [0.0293] 
Private Credit 0.0168 0.0174 0.0294 0.0302 0.0055 0.0052 
 [0.0212] [0.0207] [0.0268] [0.0261] [0.0240] [0.0230] 
Log GDP 0.0105 0.0101 0.0172 0.0169 0.015 0.0143 
 [0.0147] [0.0161] [0.0142] [0.0159] [0.0169] [0.0185] 
GDP Growth -0.002 -0.0027 0.0005 -0.0002 0.0047 0.0039 
 [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0039] [0.0038] [0.0039] 
Televisions  0.0002 0.0006 0 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002 
 [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0012] 
DLLS Index 0.0219** 0.0156* 0.0215** 0.0149* 0.0244** 0.0182* 
 [0.0099] [0.0091] [0.0093] [0.0086] [0.0112] [0.0106] 
Domestic -0.0314* -0.0306* -0.0409* -0.0399* -0.0567** -0.0560** 
 [0.0180] [0.0180] [0.0204] [0.0205] [0.0226] [0.0225] 
Diversifying 0.0006 0.0025 -0.0099 -0.0078 -0.0072 -0.0056 
 [0.0103] [0.0100] [0.0113] [0.0109] [0.0136] [0.0136] 
Size 0.0047* 0.0050* 0.0041 0.0044 0.0033 0.0036 
 [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0046] [0.0047] 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0008] 
M/B -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0008** -0.0008** 
 [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Own. Before -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] 
Stock Pr. Perf. -0.0546*** -0.0535*** -0.0552*** -0.0541*** -0.0643*** -0.0630*** 
 [0.0128] [0.0127] [0.0132] [0.0132] [0.0138] [0.0139] 
Leverage -0.0411 -0.0339 -0.0568 -0.0491 -0.0753 -0.0685 
 [0.0418] [0.0432] [0.0389] [0.0389] [0.0652] [0.0648] 
Cash Holdings 0.0134 0.0185 0.0354 0.0404 0.0103 0.0164 
 [0.0345] [0.0365] [0.0393] [0.0413] [0.0325] [0.0354] 
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Table 7. Regressions with Country- and Firm-Level Variables (cont.) 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include time-
fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Collateral 0.0117 0.0098 -0.014 -0.0161 -0.0315 -0.0327 
 [0.0220] [0.0233] [0.0286] [0.0297] [0.0314] [0.0322] 
Cash 0.0971*** 0.0993*** 0.0925*** 0.0949*** 0.0877*** 0.0898*** 
 [0.0230] [0.0232] [0.0233] [0.0234] [0.0259] [0.0257] 
Taken Private 0.0879*** 0.0917*** 0.0775*** 0.0815*** 0.0891*** 0.0930*** 
 [0.0218] [0.0224] [0.0241] [0.0249] [0.0266] [0.0271] 
Run-up -0.098 -0.1006 -0.0536 -0.0569 0.008 0.0077 
 [0.0604] [0.0608] [0.0772] [0.0772] [0.0852] [0.0851] 
       
       
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.1862 0.178 0.173 0.1647 0.1586 0.1533 
Observations 614 614 614 614 614 614 
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Table 8. Regressions with Ownership Variables 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include time-
fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -0.2013* -0.2475**  -0.2271* -0.2733**  -0.1441 -0.1993 
 [0.1150] [0.1198]    [0.1183] [0.1182]    [0.1398] [0.1371]    
Turnover over 
GDP 0.0585***              0.0606***              0.0598***              
 [0.0096]              [0.0106]              [0.0131]              
Turnover over 
Mkt. Cap  0.0350**   0.0352***  0.0404*** 
  [0.0133]     [0.0120]     [0.0132]    
English Origin 0.0504*** 0.0597*** 0.0594*** 0.0692*** 0.0337 0.0418**  
 [0.0143] [0.0152]    [0.0172] [0.0173]    [0.0206] [0.0203]    
Market Cap (% 
over GDP) -0.023 0.0194 -0.0473* -0.0035 -0.0232 0.021 
 [0.0224] [0.0208]    [0.0255] [0.0257]    [0.0311] [0.0270]    
Private Credit 0.0174 0.0184 0.0309 0.0321 0.0046 0.0049 
 [0.0204] [0.0196]    [0.0250] [0.0241]    [0.0210] [0.0197]    
Log GDP 0.0075 0.0076 0.0152 0.0154 0.0138 0.0137 
 [0.0154] [0.0168]    [0.0149] [0.0165]    [0.0174] [0.0188]    
GDP Growth -0.0011 -0.002 0.0012 0.0003 0.005 0.004 
 [0.0035] [0.0039]    [0.0036] [0.0039]    [0.0037] [0.0038]    
Televisions  0.0003 0.0007 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0001 
 [0.0007] [0.0009]    [0.0007] [0.0009]    [0.0010] [0.0011]    
DLLS Index 0.0207** 0.0142 0.0216** 0.0147*   0.0237** 0.0175*   
 [0.0095] [0.0086]    [0.0088] [0.0077]    [0.0109] [0.0102]    
Domestic -0.0284 -0.0274 -0.0395** -0.0385**  -0.0541** -0.0532**  
 [0.0170] [0.0169]    [0.0190] [0.0190]    [0.0208] [0.0204]    
Diversifying -0.0007 0.0017 -0.0103 -0.0078 -0.0057 -0.0037 
 [0.0107] [0.0106]    [0.0111] [0.0109]    [0.0126] [0.0128]    
Size 0.0045 0.0046 0.0035 0.0036 0.0025 0.0026 
 [0.0031] [0.0032]    [0.0042] [0.0043]    [0.0055] [0.0056]    
ROA -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
 [0.0007] [0.0007]    [0.0006] [0.0007]    [0.0007] [0.0008]    
M/B -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0006** -0.0006**  -0.0007** -0.0008**  
 [0.0003] [0.0003]    [0.0003] [0.0003]    [0.0003] [0.0003]    
Own. Before -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 [0.0006] [0.0006]    [0.0006] [0.0007]    [0.0007] [0.0007]    
Stock Pr. Perf. -0.0560*** -0.0549*** -0.0557*** -0.0546*** -0.0632*** -0.0620*** 
 [0.0136] [0.0135]    [0.0140] [0.0140]    [0.0146] [0.0146]    
Leverage -0.0367 -0.0308 -0.0498 -0.0435 -0.0757 -0.0707 
 [0.0478] [0.0490]    [0.0395] [0.0394]    [0.0619] [0.0612]    
Cash Holdings 0.0093 0.0131 0.0295 0.0332 -0.0044 0.0002 
 [0.0350] [0.0368]    [0.0427] [0.0442]    [0.0326] [0.0347]    
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Table 8. Regressions with Ownership Variables - (Cont.) 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include time-
fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Collateral 0.0056 0.0039 -0.0255 -0.0274 -0.0405 -0.0414 
 [0.0243] [0.0261]    [0.0277] [0.0296]    [0.0338] [0.0351]    
Cash 0.0984*** 0.1001*** 0.0948*** 0.0966*** 0.0901*** 0.0917*** 
 [0.0235] [0.0234]    [0.0249] [0.0247]    [0.0283] [0.0281]    
Taken Private 0.0881*** 0.0922*** 0.0780*** 0.0823*** 0.0907*** 0.0947*** 
 [0.0222] [0.0230]    [0.0251] [0.0259]    [0.0284] [0.0290]    
Run-up -0.0996* -0.1024*   -0.0514 -0.0549 0.012 0.0119 
 [0.0589] [0.0592]    [0.0738] [0.0739]    [0.0867] [0.0867]    
Family -0.0107 -0.0108 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0093 -0.0091 
 [0.0187] [0.0184]    [0.0192] [0.0189]    [0.0188] [0.0185]    
State -0.0138 -0.0099 -0.0008 0.0032 -0.0159 -0.0117 
 [0.0226] [0.0231]    [0.0250] [0.0248]    [0.0237] [0.0242]    
Financial -0.0462* -0.0473*   -0.0530* -0.0542*   -0.0839** -0.0845**  
 [0.0260] [0.0257]    [0.0311] [0.0309]    [0.0383] [0.0379]    
Contr. WH -0.0672*** -0.0658*** -0.0608** -0.0596**  -0.0588** -0.0572**  
 [0.0193] [0.0192]    [0.0249] [0.0248]    [0.0243] [0.0243]    
Contr. Fin. -0.0114 -0.0159 0.0007 -0.004 -0.0075 -0.0117 
 [0.0208] [0.0227]    [0.0235] [0.0262]    [0.0301] [0.0327]    
Miscellaneous -0.0674 -0.064 -0.0753* -0.0716*   -0.0341 -0.0316 
 [0.0456] [0.0467]    [0.0373] [0.0373]    [0.0600] [0.0585]    
Widely Held Fin. -0.0470** -0.0396**  -0.0463* -0.0386 -0.0214 -0.0139 
 [0.0174] [0.0191]    [0.0256] [0.0276]    [0.0378] [0.0381]    
       
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.1897 0.1805 0.1775 0.1685 0.1688 0.1631 
Observations 595 595 595 595 595 595 
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Table 9. Regressions with Deal Form Variables 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the targets’ return in 
the event window (-2, +2). The variables are defined in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. All regressions include time-fixed effects. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant -0.1352 -0.1809 -0.103 -0.1455 
 [0.1721] [0.1762] [0.1726] [0.1775]    
Turnover over GDP 0.0578***  0.0577***              
 [0.0181]  [0.0185]              
Turnover over Mkt. 
Cap  0.0393**  0.0361**  
  [0.0176]  [0.0180]    
English Origin 0.0457* 0.0526** 0.0479* 0.0575**  
 [0.0240] [0.0235] [0.0262] [0.0257]    
Market Cap (% over 
GDP) -0.0253 0.0177 -0.021 0.021 
 [0.0298] [0.0283] [0.0306] [0.0288]    
Private Credit 0.0194 0.0198 0.0184 0.0195 
 [0.0223] [0.0224] [0.0234] [0.0234]    
Log GDP 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0012 
 [0.0193] [0.0193] [0.0194] [0.0194]    
GDP Growth -0.0023 -0.003 -0.0017 -0.0028 
 [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0042]    
Televisions  0.0007 0.0012 0.0008 0.0012 
 [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0011]    
DLLS Index 0.0226* 0.0163 0.0218* 0.015 
 [0.0125] [0.0124] [0.0128] [0.0127]    
Domestic -0.0229 -0.0219 -0.0217 -0.0206 
 [0.0187] [0.0188] [0.0189] [0.0190]    
Diversifying 0.0105 0.0128 0.0117 0.0143 
 [0.0156] [0.0159] [0.0159] [0.0163]    
Size 0.0038 0.0039 0.003 0.0031 
 [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0046]    
ROA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0011 
 [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011]    
M/B -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003]    
Own. Before -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010** -0.0010**  
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]    
Stock Price Perf. -0.0538*** -0.0528*** -0.0541*** -0.0533*** 
 [0.0134] [0.0133] [0.0131] [0.0130]    
Leverage -0.0473 -0.0379 -0.0407 -0.0329 
 [0.0586] [0.0592] [0.0627] [0.0633]    
Cash Holdings -0.001 0.0035 -0.006 -0.0029 
 [0.0511] [0.0514] [0.0524] [0.0523]    
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Table 9. Regressions with Deal Form Variables (Cont.) 
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event window (-2, 2). The variables are defined 
in the Appendix. Clustered robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All regressions include 
time-fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Collateral -0.0036 -0.0063 -0.0062 -0.0092 
 [0.0350] [0.0355] [0.0382] [0.0389]    
Cash 0.0856*** 0.0878*** 0.0847*** 0.0862*** 
 [0.0208] [0.0209] [0.0214] [0.0215]    
Taken Private 0.0757*** 0.0793*** 0.0751*** 0.0791*** 
 [0.0210] [0.0212] [0.0213] [0.0215]    
Block -0.0405* -0.0417* -0.0403* -0.0420*   
 [0.0230] [0.0234] [0.0228] [0.0233]    
Merger -0.0462** -0.0465** -0.0461** -0.0463**  
 [0.0194] [0.0194] [0.0199] [0.0199]    
Open Mkt. Tr. -0.0401 -0.0456 -0.061 -0.0616 
 [0.0831] [0.0833] [0.0839] [0.0842]    
Runup -0.092 -0.0928 -0.0990* -0.1002*   
 [0.0576] [0.0579] [0.0576] [0.0580]    
Family   -0.0105 -0.0105 
   [0.0199] [0.0201]    
State   -0.0077 -0.0023 
   [0.0315] [0.0319]    
Financial   -0.0551** -0.0561**  
   [0.0275] [0.0279]    
Contr. WH   -0.0636** -0.0623*   
   [0.0322] [0.0319]    
Contr. Fin.   -0.0127 -0.0178 
   [0.0319] [0.0317]    
Miscellaneous   -0.0581 -0.0493 
   [0.0599] [0.0605]    
Widely Held Fin.   -0.0435 -0.0369 
   [0.0441] [0.0476]    
     
Adj. R-Squared 0.1889 0.181 0.1908 0.1819 
Observations 564 564 551 551 
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Table 10. Regressions with Country-Level variables and Country-Fixed Effects  
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the targets’ 
cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are defined in the 
Appendix. All regressions include time-fixed effects and country-fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. Robust 
standard errors clustered at country level are in parenthesis. The symbols ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
       
 CAR(-2, +2) CAR(-5, +5) CAR(-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -1.6886 -1.8599 -2.1714 -2.2902 -3.5678* -3.7308*   
 [1.3461] [1.3902] [1.7620] [1.7710] [2.0646] [2.0833]    
Turnover over GDP 0.0594***  0.0555***  0.0632***              
 [0.0133]  [0.0137]  [0.0151]              
Turnover over Mkt. Cap  0.0479***  0.0365**  0.0471**  
  [0.0160]  [0.0165]  [0.0194]    
Market Cap. (% over GDP) -0.0278 0.0166 -0.0219 0.0196 -0.0275 0.0198 
 [0.0307] [0.0337] [0.0335] [0.0352] [0.0405] [0.0388]    
Private Credit 0.0277 0.0362 0.0418 0.0498* 0.0127 0.0218 
 [0.0320] [0.0282] [0.0297] [0.0263] [0.0260] [0.0245]    
Log GDP 0.1861 0.1991 0.2369 0.245 0.3879* 0.3997*   
 [0.1438] [0.1476] [0.1864] [0.1872] [0.2180] [0.2198]    
GDP Growth -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0027 -0.0025 0.0002 0.0004 
 [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0030] [0.0029]    
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.099 0.0965 0.0922 0.0891 0.0435 0.041 
Observations 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 1119 
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Table 11. Regressions with Country-Fixed Effects  
The table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable is the 
targets’ cumulative abnormal return in the event windows (-2, 2), (-5, 5), and (-10, 10). The variables are 
defined in the Appendix. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are in parenthesis. All 
regressions include time-fixed effects and country-fixed effects, whose coefficients are omitted. The 
symbols ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) CAR (-10, +10) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Constant -0.6941 -1.0801 -1.1219 -1.5494 -2.3201 -2.7847 
 [1.6955] [1.7496] [2.1669] [2.1505] [2.8460] [2.7635]    
Turn. over GDP 0.0763***  0.0825***  0.0874***              
 [0.0171]  [0.0189]  [0.0230]              
Turn. Mkt Cap  0.0486*  0.0579**  0.0678*** 
  [0.0246]  [0.0218]  [0.0250]    
Mkt Cap(%GDP) -0.041 0.0114 -0.058 -0.0015 -0.0316 0.0282 
 [0.0357] [0.0334] [0.0392] [0.0365] [0.0557] [0.0489]    
Private Credit 0.0358 0.0392 0.0519 0.0559 0.0195 0.0241 
 [0.0418] [0.0390] [0.0409] [0.0387] [0.0373] [0.0361]    
Log GDP 0.0741 0.1091 0.1155 0.1543 0.2479 0.2901 
 [0.1795] [0.1846] [0.2258] [0.2243] [0.2969] [0.2886]    
GDP Growth 0.0044 0.0042 0.005 0.0049 0.0055 0.0055 
 [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0048] [0.0046]    
Domestic -0.025 -0.025 -0.0295* -0.0295* -0.0509** -0.0508**  
 [0.0172] [0.0170] [0.0171] [0.0170] [0.0205] [0.0203]    
Diversifying 0.003 0.0041 -0.0056 -0.0046 -0.0056 -0.0047 
 [0.0104] [0.0102] [0.0112] [0.0110] [0.0137] [0.0137]    
Size 0.0029 0.0029 0.0035 0.0034 0.0027 0.0025 
 [0.0034] [0.0037] [0.0041] [0.0044] [0.0051] [0.0054]    
ROA -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
 [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0008]    
M/B -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0007**  
 [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003]    
Own. Before -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007] [0.0007]    
Stock P.Perf. -0.0433*** -0.0417*** -0.0424*** -0.0406*** -0.0428*** -0.0408*** 
 [0.0123] [0.0124] [0.0107] [0.0109] [0.0093] [0.0097]    
Leverage -0.0628 -0.0643 -0.0879* -0.0894* -0.1379 -0.1392*   
 [0.0539] [0.0541] [0.0521] [0.0522] [0.0828] [0.0826]    
Cash Holdings 0.0121 0.0178 0.0446 0.0504 0.0188 0.0246 
 [0.0359] [0.0352] [0.0320] [0.0313] [0.0335] [0.0341]    
Collateral 0.0087 0.0074 -0.0154 -0.0164 -0.005 -0.0058 
 [0.0264] [0.0268] [0.0223] [0.0231] [0.0254] [0.0263]    
Cash 0.1001*** 0.0989*** 0.1015*** 0.1002*** 0.0930*** 0.0917*** 
 [0.0240] [0.0240] [0.0238] [0.0240] [0.0264] [0.0265]    
Taken Private 0.0825*** 0.0822*** 0.0759*** 0.0754*** 0.0841*** 0.0834*** 
 [0.0216] [0.0217] [0.0241] [0.0246] [0.0268] [0.0272]    
Runup -0.1036 -0.1044 0.0139 0.0133 0.1942** 0.1938**  
 [0.0643] [0.0654] [0.0827] [0.0839] [0.0813] [0.0827]    
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.1694 0.1617 0.1675 0.1608 0.1847 0.1799 
Observations 673 673 673 673 673 673 
       
       
 
 
